The corporate graveyard is littered with serial acquirers resulting from an optimistic, board approved strategy that was actually a death foretold. Shareholders were reluctant to engage in hostile action against their board on uncertain grounds and by the time they took corrective action their wealth had been decimated. The United Kingdom listing rules require the board to seek shareholder approval before making a large corporate acquisition. Does this voting right prevent bad corporate acquisitions?

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